Super Precedent by Gerhardt, Michael J.
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2006
Super Precedent
Michael J. Gerhardt
University of North Carolina School of Law, gerhardt@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Minnesota Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
1204 
Essay 
Super Precedent 
Michael J. Gerhardt†
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command in constitu-
tional adjudication, except when it is. The potential of stare de-
cisis as an inexorable command came to public attention when 
Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter asked John Roberts 
during his confirmation hearings to be Chief Justice of the 
United States whether Roberts agreed there were “super-duper 
precedents” in constitutional law.1 The nominee left open the 
possibility of there being such precedent, though he refrained 
from citing specific examples. In asking about “super-duper 
precedents,” Senator Specter was reputedly borrowing a notion 
of stare decisis initially recognized by Circuit Judge Michael 
Luttig, who once referred to Roe v. Wade2 as having achieved 
“super-stare decisis” in constitutional law because of its re-
peated re-affirmation by the Court.3 
†  Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law and Di-
rector of Center on Law and Government, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill School of Law. I am grateful for the constructive and thoughtful 
feedback I received on this paper from the participants in the Minnesota Law 
Review’s Symposium, The Future of the Supreme Court: Institutional Reform 
and Beyond. In addition, I am grateful for the comments I received on this pro-
ject from participants in a faculty workshop at Cleveland-Marshall Law School 
and from Neil Siegal and his constitutional theory discussion group at Duke 
Law School. I also thank Jeremy Falcone for his excellent research assistance. 
1. See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 4 at 1 (“The term superprecedents first surfaced at the 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Judge John Roberts, when Senator 
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
asked him whether he agreed that certain cases like Roe had become super-
precedents or ‘super-duper’ precedents—that is, that they were so deeply em-
bedded in the fabric of law they should be especially hard to overturn.”). 
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 376–77 (4th
Cir. 2000); see also Rosen, supra note 1 (“An origin of the idea [of super prece-
dent] was a 2000 opinion written by J. Michael Luttig, a judge on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who regularly appears on short 
lists for the Supreme Court.”). 
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In my contribution to this symposium, I explore the signifi-
cance and coherence of Senator Specter’s and Judge Luttig’s 
notions of “super precedent.” In particular, I agree (apparently 
with Chief Justice Roberts) that, at least as a descriptive mat-
ter, there may be something akin to “super precedent” in con-
stitutional law. The notion of super precedent has something in 
common with “super-statutes,” which William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn have described as those statutes that “success-
fully penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a 
deep way.”4 Of course, constitutional precedents have different 
legal status than their statutory counterparts: the former may 
preempt or displace statutory decisions, and may only be over-
ridden by constitutional amendment or by the Court reversing 
itself. While a super precedent begins as a single decision, it 
hardly ends there. Super precedents are the doctrinal, or deci-
sional, foundations for subsequent lines of judicial decisions (of-
ten but not always in more than one area of constitutional law). 
Super precedents are those constitutional decisions in which 
public institutions have heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and 
consistently supported over a significant period of time. Super 
precedents are deeply embedded into our law and lives through 
the subsequent activities of the other branches. Super prece-
dents seep into the public consciousness, and become a fixture 
of the legal framework.5 Super precedents are the constitu-
4. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1215, 1215 (2001).
5. Interestingly, Abraham Lincoln recognized something akin to super
precedent. In the course of his debates with Stephen Douglas in their 1857 
Senate race, Lincoln contrasted Dred Scott v. Sanford with other constitu-
tional decisions deserving more respect from political leaders. He explained 
that 
[j]udicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, ac-
cording to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with
common sense, and the customary understanding of the legal profes-
sion.
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous con-
currence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and 
in accordance with legal public expectation, and with the steady prac-
tice of the departments throughout our history, and had been, in no 
part, based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if 
wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, 
and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of 
years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolu-
tionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent. 
Abraham Lincoln, Response to Douglas in Representatives’ Hall in the Illinois 
State House (June 26, 1857), in THE LIVING LINCOLN: THE MAN, HIS MIND, 
HIS TIMES, AND THE WAR HE FOUGHT, RECONSTRUCTED FROM HIS OWN WRIT-
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tional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable issue for 
courts to decide; it is no longer a matter on which courts will 
expend their limited resources. Super precedents are the clear-
est instances in which the institutional values promoted by fi-
delity to precedent—consistency, stability, predictability, and 
social reliance—have become irredeemably compelling.6 Thus, 
super precedents take on a special status in constitutional law 
as landmark opinions, so encrusted and deeply embedded in 
constitutional law that they have become practically immune to 
reconsideration and reversal. 
The first three Parts of this Essay are descriptive. Each 
considers a principal form in which a Supreme Court precedent 
may assume the status of being “super” in American constitu-
tional law. Part I examines super precedent in the form of 
foundational institutional practices, such as judicial review. 
The second Part examines super precedent in the form of foun-
dational doctrine, which refers to Supreme Court decisions that 
govern, support, and define over time basic or general ap-
proaches to, or understandings of, certain classes of constitu-
tional disputes. The Court’s standards for determining classical 
political questions are a salient example. Part III examines su-
per precedent in the form of decisions on particular questions of 
constitutional law that are so well settled and enduringly ac-
cepted by the Court, other branches, and the general public 
(through societal acquiescence) that they are practically im-
mune to reversal. After identifying several precedents that I be-
lieve clearly qualify as “super precedents,” I explore which oth-
ers may not be super precedents and why, including Roe v. 
Wade. 
The final Part is both theoretical and evaluative. Initially, 
I briefly address a handful of criticisms of super precedent as a 
theoretical construct. Second, I consider the implications that 
the phenomenon of super precedent pose for constitutional the-
ory and practice. Super precedent poses a problem for constitu-
tional theorists, as well as judicial nominees, who purport to be 
rigidly committed to construing the Constitution in terms of a 
single unifying concept. Thus, super precedent is important, as 
INGS 201, 201 (Paul M. Angle & Earl Schenck Miers eds., 1955). 
6. I have argued elsewhere that judicial precedents that are deeply em-
bedded into our legal system impose the greatest degree of path dependency, 
albeit narrowly, on subsequent constitutional adjudication. Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
903, 951–52 (2005). 
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a practical matter, to the implementation of constitutional val-
ues.  
As the last Part demonstrates, Supreme Court confirma-
tion proceedings are a crucial forum for implementing, defend-
ing, and weakening constitutional precedent. The Senate Judi-
ciary Committee and the Senate are gatekeepers in filtering 
out the constitutional views that senators want to see reflected 
on the Supreme Court. Consequently, super precedent provides 
a baseline for measuring whether nominees’ judicial philoso-
phies, or attitudes, fit within the constitutional mainstream. 
Super precedent is integral to the Court’s operations because it 
is an aspect of the Court that endures in spite of changes in its 
composition. Super precedent marks the point at which the in-
stitutional values of stability, consistency, institutional and so-
cial reliance, and predictability in constitutional law become 
compelling, enduring, and fixed. Super precedent reflects, in 
short, what may be sacred in American constitutional law. 
I. FOUNDATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES
The first kind of super precedent consists of longstanding
Supreme Court decisions that establish what I call founda-
tional institutional practices. These decisions create and main-
tain particular modes of operation or particular practices that 
become indispensable to the functioning of our government. 
The practices established by these precedents have become so 
well entrenched within our society, have been so repeatedly en-
dorsed and supported by public institutions, and have been the 
source of so many other lines of decisions, that they may be un-
done only through the most extremely radical, unprecedented 
acts of political and judicial will. 
A prime example of a foundational institutional practice is 
judicial review. Over the course of two hundred years, judicial 
review has become a permanent fixture of our constitutional 
order. Moreover, the scope of judicial review has grown, not 
shrunk, over time. While academics and some political leaders 
passionately argue against the institution of judicial review 
and advocate its abandonment altogether,7 their calls remain 
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 117 (1996) (arguing for the abolition of 
judicial review); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM 
THE COURTS 6–53 (1999) (challenging judicial review); Girardeau A. Spann, 
Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 656–67 (2005) (arguing for the 
abandonment of judicial review in the context of affirmative action). 
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unfulfilled. Nor does there appear to be any chance, at least in 
the foreseeable future, that those calls will be heeded. There 
simply are no signs of any serious and sustained political and 
social movement to abandon judicial review altogether. Con-
sider, for instance, that no Supreme Court nominee rejects the 
lawfulness of extensive judicial review, and that no one is ap-
pointed to the Court with a record of explicitly opposing the in-
stitution of judicial review to the Supreme Court. 
I merely offer two examples of super precedents which pro-
vide (and are widely recognized as providing) support for the 
constitutional underpinnings of the institutional practice of ju-
dicial review. The first is Marbury v. Madison.8 Marbury was 
one of the first, but hardly has been the last, instance in which 
the Supreme Court exercised judicial review over the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute. While the Court’s justifications for 
exercising judicial review (generally and in the particular cir-
cumstances of the case) have been questioned, the institution it 
sanctioned endures. The case has effectively become a political 
and legal icon as the foundation for the Court’s exercise of judi-
cial review generally and for lawfully subjecting high-ranking 
executive officials (including presidents) to the judicial process. 
As such, the Court repeatedly cites Marbury as authority for 
the exercise of judicial review of executive action and for the 
other branches’ actions to limit or constrain judicial authority.9 
Countless other decisions by the Supreme Court (not to men-
tion lesser judicial tribunals) rely on Marbury, for both what it 
says and what it has come to mean. The case is the standard 
citation in textbooks and treatises for the basic practice of judi-
cial review. The decision has become legendary in the study of 
constitutional law, and students (from grade school to law 
school) as well as lawyers, judges, Justices, members of Con-
gress, and presidents accept Marbury’s recognition of the con-
stitutional authority for judicial review as sacrosanct in Ameri-
can constitutional law. Societal acquiescence in Marbury, as a 
defense and authority for the exercise of judicial review of fed-
eral authorities, is deeply engrained in the public consciousness 
and the fabric of American law. Other public institutions have 
come to rely on its endurance for over two centuries. The sym-
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (citing Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176, in an attempt to limit judicial authority); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 
177, for the exercise of judicial review in an executive official case).  
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bolic importance of the case, as it has been applied and repeat-
edly reinterpreted over more than two centuries, entrenches it 
more deeply into the foundations of American constitutional 
law. The fact that the decision has constantly been interpreted 
and reinterpreted over the years has not robbed it of its signifi-
cance in constitutional law. To the contrary, the decision’s sym-
bolic importance reflects its enduring value in constitutional 
law. Moreover, the fact that the decision is fundamental to con-
stitutional law in more than one way—as the Court’s first 
elaborate defense of judicial review as well as one of its first 
rulings subjecting high-ranking executive officials to the judi-
cial process—embeds it deeply into the fabric of constitutional 
law. Scholars can question Marbury, but overruling the case 
and particularly its recognition of the compatibility of the insti-
tution of judicial review with the Constitution is unimaginable 
(and would require expunging reliance on it in countless other 
courts, decisions, and settings). 
The other example of a super precedent establishing or re-
inforcing the institution of judicial review is Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,10 in which the Supreme Court recognized the constitu-
tional necessity for the exercise of Supreme Court review over a 
state court judgment resting on interpretations of federal law.11 
As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked with reference 
to Martin, “I do not think the United States would come to an 
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do 
think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that 
declaration as to the laws of the several states.”12 While it is 
reasonable to assume the public (and perhaps many lawmak-
ers) are not familiar with Martin by name, they are familiar 
with, and widely accept, the fact that the Supreme Court may 
review the constitutionality of a state law in conflict with some 
federal law, state court judgment on federal law, or state actor’s 
failure to comply with either the United States Constitution or 
other federal law. Every time the Court exercises judicial re-
view over some state action, it reinforces Martin and extends 
its legacy. Presidents and members of Congress stand by the 
10. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11. Id. at 379–80. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), is
equally important for its recognition of the constitutional necessity for Su-
preme Court review over state criminal cases, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 264, 375–
431. 
12. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 291, 295–96 (1920). 
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constitutional necessity for judicial review of state activity im-
pinging on the federal Constitution or other federal laws. While 
Michigan v. Long13 might have given state supreme courts op-
tions for maneuvering around Martin,14 no Supreme Court de-
cision has weakened its fundamental importance in constitu-
tional law. And while state officials have sometimes resisted 
the logic and implications of Martin,15 they have much more of-
ten accepted, as have federal officials, its fundamental premise 
as a permanent feature of American constitutional law. 
II. FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE
A second kind of super precedent consists of Supreme 
Court decisions establishing what I call foundational doctrine. 
Foundational doctrine refers to the support in case law for rec-
ognizing the existence and application of basic categories, 
kinds, or classes of constitutional disputes that endure over 
time. 
A prime example of this kind of super precedent is the Su-
preme Court’s decisions upholding the incorporation doctrine, 
which provides the basis for the Court’s review of state action 
allegedly violating the guarantees of almost all of the first eight 
amendments. To be sure, Justice Clarence Thomas has urged 
his colleagues to reconsider the Court’s decision making the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment applicable to the 
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.16 But, Justice Thomas stands alone in making this plea. 
And while the Court employed more than one standard for de-
termining whether to incorporate a specific guarantee of the 
Bill of Rights,17 the Justices uniformly accept the incorporation 
13. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
14. Id. at 1044 (holding that when state court decisions rest on federal
law, the Court will infer that the state court believed that federal law required 
it to do so). 
15. The most prominent example of this resistance can be seen in the
Southern Manifesto. For a general discussion of the resistance to Martin dur-
ing this period, see WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, SOTIRIOS A. BAR-
BER, & STEPHEN MACEDO, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 271–
384 (3d ed. 2003). 
16. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which 
clearly protects an individual right, applies against the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . But the Establishment Clause is another mat-
ter.”). 
17. Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response
to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 571–72 (1998) (“Initially, the Su-
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doctrine as it stands today—recognizing the incorporation of 
almost all of the individual guarantees in the first eight amend-
ments of the Bill of Rights. They build on that doctrine every 
day. Whenever the Supreme Court reviews states’ possible vio-
lations of one of the guarantees of the first eight amendments, 
it reinforces the incorporation doctrine. The bulk of First and 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, for instance, has been 
forged in cases involving the constitutionality of state, rather 
than federal, actions. Moreover, incorporation of most of the 
Bill of Rights makes judicial review of many other constitu-
tional disputes possible. The incorporation doctrine does not 
dictate how the Court ought to resolve particular claims of 
state violations of incorporated liberties, but it provides the ba-
sis for judicial review of these claims. Consequently, it is easy 
to see why a landmark opinion such as Mapp v. Ohio18 has be-
come a super precedent. It recognized a principle that endures 
to this day—the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.19 More-
over, it became the foundation on which most judicial review of 
Fourth Amendment claims takes place. Similarly, one of the 
last cases in which the Court upheld the incorporation of a spe-
cific constitutional guarantee, Duncan v. Louisiana,20 may be a 
super precedent because it sealed incorporation doctrine at the 
same time it set forth an enduring framework for making sense 
of the Court’s incorporation doctrine. 
Another example of super precedent establishing founda-
tional doctrine is the Supreme Court’s case law establishing 
classical political questions as nonjusticiable. In Marbury v. 
Madison, Chief Justice Marshall recognized a distinction be-
tween a legal question, which a court may decide, and a politi-
cal question, which is left to the final decision-making of some 
preme Court used the fundamental fairness approach to protect certain indi-
vidual rights against state action. Later, the Court adopted the selective in-
corporation approach and applied the precise language of portions of the Bill of 
Rights against the states. Finally, although the total incorporation doctrine 
has never been accepted by a majority of the sitting members of the Court, the 
historical arguments made in favor of total incorporation provide an intellec-
tual foundation for the application of the majority of the Bill of Rights against 
the states.”). 
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. Id. at 655 (declaring all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment inadmissible in state court). 
20. 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
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nonjudicial authority. In Luther v. Borden,21 the Court found 
that claims brought under the Constitution’s Guaranty Clause 
are nonjusticiable,22 a judgment that endures to this day. Just 
as importantly, Luther v. Borden is famous for recognizing the 
classical political question doctrine, which treats as 
nonjusticiable matters committed by the Constitution to other 
authorities’ final decision-making.23 That understanding of the 
political question doctrine endured until the Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Brennan, revised it in Baker v. Carr.24 In that 
case, the Warren Court “clarified” the political question doc-
trine to include several prudential criteria for determining po-
litical questions.25 Baker’s articulation of the political question 
doctrine has been followed by courts ever since. Thus, Baker v. 
Carr is a super precedent because it not only set forth the en-
during test for determining nonjusticiable political questions 
but also recognized the justiciability of constitutional chal-
lenges to gerrymandering. 
Powerfully supporting this reading of Baker are the dozens of post-
1962 voting and school desegregation cases, where the Court has af-
firmed or required federal court civil rights injunctions in the face of 
strong popular and official opposition. Even more dramatic have been 
the orders entered in other institutional reform litigation, especially 
21. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id. (“[A]ccording to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in
every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may alter and 
change their form of government at their own pleasure. But whether they 
have changed it or not by abolishing an old government, and establishing a 
new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the political power. And 
when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its deci-
sion, and to follow it.”). 
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. Id. at 210–11 (“We have said that ‘In determining whether a question
falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our 
system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political de-
partments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination 
are dominant considerations.’ The nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers. Much confusion results from 
the capacity of the ‘political question’ label to obscure the need for case-by-case 
inquiry. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of 
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a deli-
cate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this 
Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To demonstrate this re-
quires no less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the 
analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine.” (quoting 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939))). 
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tems.26 
If that were not enough, Baker and its progeny provided 
the foundation for the Supreme Court’s review of the dispute 
over the Florida vote count in the presidential election of 2000. 
As a practical matter, it was practically impossible to claim the 
dispute in Bush v. Gore27 was nonjusticiable, given the Court’s 
numerous other opinions, beginning with Baker, allowing judi-
cial review of election disputes. 
III. FOUNDATIONAL DECISIONS
This brings us to what is in all likelihood the most contro-
versial form of super precedent. It consists of particular Su-
preme Court decisions on discrete questions of constitutional 
law that (1) have endured over time; (2) political institutions 
repeatedly have endorsed and supported; (3) have influenced or 
shaped doctrine in at least one area of constitutional law; (4) 
have enjoyed, in one form or another, widespread social acqui-
escence; and (5) are widely recognized by the courts as no 
longer meriting the expenditure of scarce judicial resources. Af-
ter examining several precedents that conceivably qualify as 
super precedents in the form of foundational decisions, I ex-
plain why several other well-known but persistently controver-
sial precedents are not super precedents. I explain what these 
decisions need to demonstrate to attain the special status of 
“super precedent” at some future point in constitutional law. 
A. ILLUSTRATIONS OF FOUNDATIONAL DECISIONS AS SUPER
PRECEDENT
While I believe it is possible to identify more than a few 
examples of super precedent in the form of foundational deci-
sions, I discuss only a few for the sake of brevity. To begin with, 
an excellent example of a foundational decision super precedent 
is Knox v. Lee (or, the Legal Tender Cases).28 Though not widely 
known by name outside constitutional law circles, the Ameri-
can people are very familiar with the outcome of this decision, 
because they live with it, and take advantage of it, every day. 
Whatever the merits of the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox v. 
26. DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1201 (3d ed. 2003). 
27. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
28. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
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Lee, its decision to uphold the constitutionality of paper 
money29 has become a super precedent. The possibility of over-
turning the decision—and of returning to a world without legal 
tender—is simply unthinkable. There has been extraordinary 
social, political, and economic reliance on this decision in both 
the public and private sectors. Indeed, no one—not even schol-
ars who believe the case was wrongly decided—seriously be-
lieves the decision ought to be revisited. The prospect of the so-
cial, political, and economic disaster that would result from its 
overruling makes it a permanent fixture in American constitu-
tional law. 
Bill Eskridge’s and John Ferejohn’s provocative work on 
super-statutes suggest other possible examples of super prece-
dent.30 In particular, they suggest that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,31 the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,32 and the Endan-
gered Species Act of 197333 are examples of “super-statutes.”34 
Each of these federal statutes has long been widely accepted 
into the public consciousness, and each provides the framework 
and support for other legislation.35 One does not have to agree 
with Eskridge and Ferejohn that each of these statutes has 
quasi-constitutional status36 in order to appreciate that the 
constitutional decisions supporting these grand pieces of legis-
lation qualify as super precedents. These decisions each: (1) es-
tablished fundamental institutional frameworks or principles 
in constitutional law; (2) have been consistently supported by 
national political leaders for decades; (3) provide support for 
additional case law and legislation; and (4) enjoy widespread 
public support or societal acquiescence. Consequently, they 
have become deeply entrenched in our legal system.37 It is not 
important that the public is unaware of the particular names of 
the cases supporting these pieces of landmark legislation. What 
is important is that the precedents supporting these laws are 
as deeply ingrained in our society as the legislation they up-
29. Id. at 80.
30. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 4.
31. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2000).
33. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 16 U.S.C. (2000)). 
34. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 4, at 1231–46.
35. See id. at 1216–17.
36. Id. at 1217.
37. See id. at 1215–17.
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hold. Each time a president renews these laws, expands them, 
signs others like them into law, praises them, and looks to 
them as models for other laws, they become more deeply en-
trenched in our culture, our laws, and our society. Political in-
stitutions, social movements, economic forces, and the Ameri-
can people have heavily invested in the byproducts of these 
decisions. Nothing short of a constitutional revolution could 
make the undoing of these precedents possible. 
Brown v. Board of Education38 is a case in point. Initially, 
the Warren Court’s unanimous decision to strike down state-
mandated segregation in public schools provoked considerable 
backlash, particularly in the South.39 As Michael Klarman and 
others have shown, state-mandated segregation in public 
schooling did not truly come to an end until national political 
leaders fell behind Brown in the late 1950s, particularly 
through politically and socially significant legislation such as 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.40 
Brown may not have reached “super” status, though, until 
the Court systematically struck down state-mandated segrega-
tion in public facilities other than schools, the Court acknowl-
edged its foundational status, and it became virtually required 
for Supreme Court nominees to declare their acceptance of it as 
a condition for their confirmation by the Senate. Robert Bork’s 
nomination to the Court foundered in part because of his can-
did criticism of Brown.41 While Clarence Thomas rebuked the 
Court to some extent for its decision in Brown, he did not signal 
in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings any agenda or in-
tention to abandon or weaken it. Nor, more importantly, did 
Justice Thomas suggest he would call into question the land-
mark legislation Brown and its progeny arguably spawned,42 
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of
Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 396–98 (2000). 
40. Michael Klarman, An Interpretative History of Modern Equal Protec-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 241–43 (1991). 
41. Snyder, supra note 39, at 468 (“Responding to a softball question from
Senator Thurmond about this apparent conflict, Bork admitted that ‘as a mat-
ter of original intent, I am not at all sure that segregation was not intended to 
be eliminated.’” (quoting Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 132 (1987))). 
42. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 102d Cong. 489 (1991) (“I have no agenda to change existing case law. 
That is not my predisposition, and it is not the way that I approach my job.” 
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including the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act. Had he called these laws into question, he might have been 
rejected. But, he was reluctant to do so, no doubt in part be-
cause he understood that to reject these laws would have been 
political suicide. Subsequent nominees, including Chief Justice 
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, have declared unambi-
guously their fidelity to Brown and to the landmark legislation, 
and thus the precedents upholding them, embedding it deeply 
into American culture, society, and constitutional law.43 
It would be a mistake to assume all super precedents sup-
port liberal policies. For instance, the Civil Rights Cases,44 de-
cided in 1883, are, in all likelihood, a super precedent. The de-
cision recognized a basic principle of constitutional law—that 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action45—that 
endures to this day. The Court has re-affirmed that principle in 
several other cases, most recently in United States v. Morri-
son.46 Thus, the Court has extended the principle set forth in 
the Civil Rights Cases for more than a century, and the princi-
ple applies to all constitutional doctrine. The Court has repeat-
edly fashioned other constitutional doctrine with the state-
action requirement in mind, and Congress has similarly fash-
ioned other legislation with the principle of the Civil Rights 
Cases in mind. 
Similarly, the Court’s opinion in Washington v. Davis47 is a 
super precedent. The Supreme Court has steadfastly stood by 
the principle set forth in the case,48 and built many other equal 
protection decisions on it until it became an essential, enduring 
part of the Court’s framework for equal protection law. 
(statement of Judge Clarence Thomas)). 
43. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 109th Cong. 144, 167–68, 262–63 (2005) (statement of Judge John Rob-
erts) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing]; U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee Holds a Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito’s Nomination to the Su-
preme Court, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/alitoday2.php (Jan. 10, 2006) (tran-
script at 58) (statement of Judge Samuel Alito) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation 
Hearing]. 
44. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
45. Id. at 6.
46. 529 U.S. 598, 599–600 (2000).
47. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
48. Id. at 239 (holding that a law or official act, without regard to whether
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is not unconstitutional solely be-
cause it has a racially discriminatory impact). 
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Yet another super precedent is the well-known separation- 
of-powers decision of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer.49 Chief Justice Roberts almost said as much in his confir-
mation hearings,50 and Justice Alito expressed similar senti-
ments in his hearings.51 Indeed, Supreme Court Justices for 
years have given special deference to the concurring opinion of 
Justice Jackson in that case. Members of Congress routinely 
cite Youngstown in separation of powers discussions.52 They, 
too, tend to defer to Justice Jackson’s concurrence, often refer-
encing it in confirmation hearings. Presidents similarly have 
pledged fidelity to Youngstown, frequently citing Jackson’s con-
currence as authority. Jackson’s concurrence has become popu-
lar because it provides a roadmap for lawmakers to follow. 
B. SEPARATING SUPER PRECEDENT FROM INFAMOUS
PRECEDENT
No simple or conclusive test exists to identify super prece-
dent. Some cases may be quite well known because of the con-
troversy that they have generated—Lochner v. New York53 and 
Dred Scott v. Sanford54 are but two examples—while other 
lesser known cases may have achieved special status precisely 
because they no longer generate any controversy. The extent of 
a precedent’s notoriety does not lead inexorably to the conclu-
sion that it is so deeply entrenched in our legal system as to be 
effectively immune to reconsideration. 
We might be able to agree in the abstract that foundational 
decisions may be precedents fixed in the public consciousness 
and constitutional doctrine, but we should avoid supposing this 
element is the sine qua non of a super precedent. Notoriety is a 
factor whose legal significance needs to be carefully measured. 
Consider, for instance, whether Miranda v. Arizona55 is a super 
49. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
50. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 370 (“I agree with the
basic proposition that the President’s authority is at its greatest when he has 
the support of Congress.” (statement of Judge John Roberts)).  
51. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 8 (statement of Judge
Samuel Alito, responding affirmatively to Sen. Arlen Specter’s question: “I 
want to . . . ask you first if you agree with the quotation from Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in the Youngstown Steel [S]eizure case about the evaluation of 
presidential power”). 
52.  See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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precedent. The case has long had its critics, but a series of fac-
tors—the Court’s re-affirmation of the decision in Dickerson v. 
United States,56 its persistent backing and long-standing sup-
port from law enforcement authorities (for roughly four dec-
ades) and from political leaders around the country, and the 
public’s recognition and awareness of Miranda—all have given 
Miranda iconic status within the law. Moreover, it extends the 
Court’s doctrine opposing legislative attempts to overturn its 
constitutional decisions and directives on what it to do in con-
stitutional adjudication. The difficulty with characterizing 
Miranda as a super precedent is that the Supreme Court has 
recognized a number of exceptions weakening (some say, evis-
cerating) Miranda.57 While the decision endures symbolically in 
the public consciousness, it does not endure with the same ro-
bustness it first had. It retains limited special status in consti-
tutional law, even in its weakened state.58 
Another decision that arguably has some of the qualities of 
a super precedent is Wickard v. Filburn.59 Notorious as it is in 
some circles, it endures. It is one of several decisions establish-
ing the New Deal’s constitutional foundations.60 Unanimously 
decided, it was reaffirmed by the Court in United States v. Lo-
pez.61 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly went out of his 
way to reconcile the Court’s decision in Lopez with Wickard and 
56. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
57. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (striking down
the police practice of first obtaining a confession without giving Miranda 
warnings, then issuing warnings and obtaining the confession again, but per-
mitting this practice if the Miranda warnings delivered midstream are “effec-
tive enough to accomplish their object”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 
655–56 (1984) (creating a public safety exception to the Miranda warnings); 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (holding that Miranda 
safeguards come into play only when a person in custody is subject to either 
express questioning or its functional equivalent); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222, 224–26 (1971) (allowing statements made before Miranda warnings for 
the purpose of impeaching defendant’s credibility). 
58. Undoubtedly, the fact that the constitutional scholar who mapped out
a strategy for undoing Miranda lost his cause, but is now a federal district 
judge obliged to follow Miranda, further entrenches it in constitutional law. 
See Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in 
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001). Cassell was sworn in as a U.S. Dis-
trict Court judge for the District of Utah on July 2, 2002. University of Utah, 
S.J. Quinney College of Law, Faculty and Administration, http://www.law 
.utah.edu/faculty/bios/cassellp.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). 
59. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
60. Id. at 128–29.
61. 514 U.S. 549, 554–57 (1995).
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to emphasize that the Court in Lopez was not reconsidering or 
overturning any of its prior Commerce Clause decisions.62 The 
Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich63 further reinforced 
Wickard. Nevertheless, Justice Thomas clearly disagrees with 
the reasoning in Wickard,64 and Chief Justice Roberts refused 
in his confirmation hearings to acknowledge Wickard as firmly 
or irrevocably settled. Instead, Roberts suggested that the 
question decided in Wickard could come back before the 
Court.65 While it may be premature to call Wickard a super 
precedent, it comes closer than perhaps Miranda does. Indeed, 
it comes closer to being super precedent with each day that 
passes and with each piece of legislation Congress passes—and 
the Court upholds—in its mold. 
Yet another decision that may have some qualities of a su-
per precedent is Griswold v. Connecticut.66 Despite the fact that 
the Justices recognized as many as five different theories for 
recognizing a marital right of privacy in Griswold,67 and al-
though some conservative scholars continue to pillory the deci-
sion,68 Griswold has become entrenched in constitutional law in 
a number of subsequent decisions. Moreover, Supreme Court 
nominees over the past few decades have realized that accept-
ing Griswold smooths their path to the Court. It has been no 
62. Id. at 559–60.
63. 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206–08 (2005).
64. Id. at 2235–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 261–63 (“But I would
say that because [Wickard] has come up again so recently in the Raich case 
that it’s an area where I think it’s inappropriate for me to comment on my per-
sonal view about whether it’s correct or not . . . . Nobody in recent years has 
been arguing whether Marbury v. Madison is good law. Nobody has been argu-
ing whether Brown v. Board of Education was good law. They have been argu-
ing whether Wickard v. Filburn is good law.” (statement of Judge John Rob-
erts)). 
66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. Justice Douglas found a right to privacy in the “penumbra” of the enu-
merated rights of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. Justice Goldberg found a right 
to privacy in the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(“[S]ince 1791 [the Ninth Amendment] has been a basic part of the Constitu-
tion . . . . To hold that a right so basic and fundamental . . . as the right of pri-
vacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in . . . 
the first eight amendments . . . is to ignore the Ninth Amendment . . . .”). Jus-
tices Harlan and White based their opinion on the Due Process Clause. Id. at 
500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
68. Robert Bork, for example, has acknowledged his disagreement with
the decision. See Linda P. Campbell, Thomas Supports a Right to Privacy: Re-
ply Surprises Democrats; Judge Won’t Discuss Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 
1991, at A1. 
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accident that Justices David Souter and Samuel Alito picked 
Justice John Marshall Harlan as one of the Justices whom they 
admired most, no doubt because of the eloquence and narrow-
ness of his concurrence in Griswold.69 Chief Justice Roberts, 
too, accepted Griswold, albeit narrowly defined.70 The Senate’s 
rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Court was 
grounded in part on his candid acknowledgment that Griswold 
was wrongly decided.71 Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Tho-
mas openly criticized Griswold in their respective confirmation 
hearings,72 and Chief Justice Roberts further acknowledged in 
his confirmation hearings not only eighty years’ worth of deci-
sions supporting a marital right of privacy but also the absence 
of any agenda, or inclination, to undo the decision.73 
If Griswold were not yet a “super precedent” for some rea-
son, it may be a consequence of sharp disagreements over its 
extension to other realms, especially in the context of abortion 
(though it has been recognized by the Court as part of the 
foundation of the Court’s relatively longstanding recognition of 
a constitutionally protected right to traditional marriage). Jus-
tices and others who support the outcome in Roe v. Wade74 may 
be eager to give Roe “super precedent” status, but the persis-
tent condemnation of Roe, particularly by national political 
leaders—including Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and 
George W. Bush, as well as a current majority of the United 
States Senate—undermines its claim to entrenchment.  
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUPER PRECEDENT FOR
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND DESIGN
In this Part, I consider the utility of introducing the notion 
of super precedent into constitutional analysis. First, I briefly 
address several criticisms of the theoretical construct of super 
precedent. Second, I examine the significance of super prece-
69. See id.; Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 129 (“[Y]ou’ve
expressed admiration for . . . Harlan”) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer). 
70. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 565–66 (state-
ment of Judge John Roberts, responding to written questions from Sen. Di-
anne Feinstein). 
71. See Campbell, supra note 68.
72. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1996); Campbell, supra note 68. 
73. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 207 (“I agree
with the Griswold court’s conclusion that marital privacy extends to contra-
ception and availability of that.” (statement of Judge John Roberts)). 
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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dent as a crucial mechanism for implementing constitutional 
values.  
A. RESPONSES TO FIVE CRITICISMS
At least five criticisms may be leveled against importation
of the concept of super precedent into constitutional law. First, 
Professor Randy Barnett argues against recognizing any prior 
Supreme Court decisions as super precedent on the ground that 
it would immunize at least some questions of constitutional law 
from ever being reconsidered.75 The danger is that declaring 
something as super precedent makes it off limits for criticism 
or correction. He suggests that the Court always needs to have 
the freedom to reconsider its precedents whenever it deems re-
consideration appropriate.76  
 The principal difficulty with this criticism is that super 
precedent plays an important function in constitutional law. 
Super precedent is a construct employed to signify the rela-
tively rare times when it makes eminent sense to recognize 
that the correctness of a decision is a secondary (or far less im-
portant) consideration than its permanence. Securing the per-
manence of some decisions extends all of the institutional val-
ues advanced by fidelity to precedent, including the 
preservation of stability and scarce judicial resources. More-
over, judicial closure on some constitutional questions ought 
not to be confused with the extent of a precedent’s constraining 
effect on subsequent adjudication. Merely designating some-
thing as super precedent does not preclude scholars from ques-
tioning a judicial decision (as some scholars still do, for in-
stance, with respect to the Court’s incorporation doctrine) or 
developing a sustained attack on seemingly settled constitu-
tional doctrine. The point is that a super precedent is the cul-
mination of sustained support from political leaders and the 
federal judiciary generally, including the Court, over time. The 
enduring support is the (short) answer to Professor Barnett’s 
concerns.  
 The second criticism is the apparent impossibility of de-
termining the requisite length of time that a judicial precedent 
must endure before it may be designated as a super precedent 
75. See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Prece-
dent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1238–47 
(2006).  
76. Id.
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in constitutional law. The problem with super precedent is that 
time alone is not a reliable measure of the special status of at 
least some precedents in constitutional law. 
 I agree that time alone is not the measure of a precedent’s 
attainment of special status in constitutional law. Moreover, I 
concede the impossibility of determining a minimum length of 
time for a precedent to endure before it may be called a super 
precedent. It is of course impossible to know what will happen 
years or centuries from now. No one can prove that the Court 
will refrain from reconsidering for all time some decisions 
which we think are firmly settled. Nevertheless, focusing on 
the longevity of a precedent misses the point. Longstanding 
precedents, especially in important cases, are rarely overturned 
in a single bound. A case that can credibly be characterized as a 
super precedent is distinctive in part because it is so deeply en-
grained in constitutional law that it cannot be reconsidered—
much less overturned—without considerable excavation. In 
practice, this means that if and when the time ever came to re-
consider super precedent it would only occur after persistent 
warnings and attacks (both on and off the Court). Plessy v. Fer-
guson,77 for example, was not simply left untouched in a shrine 
until the Court began to dismantle the decision in the 1950s. To 
the contrary, it was attacked systematically in a series of law-
suits brought by the NAACP, culminating in Brown.78 Simi-
larly, the so-called right to contract recognized in Lochner v. 
New York79 was not only overruled sub silentio a few years 
later80 but the right to contract it recognized was the target of a 
good deal of litigation for decades.81 Important cases tend not to 
disappear in the absence of concerted, sustained efforts to over-
rule them. The time required for precedents to become deeply 
entrenched and immune to reconsideration is less important 
than the fact that persistent challenges are indicia of the fail-
ure of precedents to achieve super precedent status. 
77. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). 
78. 347 U.S. 483.
79. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), implicitly overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–98 (1937). 
80. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 397–98.
81. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 921 (1952); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by 
West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 388–400. 
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 The third criticism follows from the second. It maintains 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove the existence of a 
super precedent. If it were possible that any precedent, no mat-
ter how fixed at a given point in time, could conceivably be sub-
ject to reconsideration, then it makes no sense to declare some-
thing as a super precedent. The status, after all, is apparently 
subject to change, not to mention the exasperating difficulty of 
not being able to demonstrate once and for all that a particular 
decision qualifies as a super precedent.  
 This criticism misses the mark. Very few cases are likely to 
qualify as super precedents. We can only be sure whether 
something qualifies as a super precedent after we verify the 
convergence of a number of factors in support of a particular 
decision. The important point is that the factors are relatively 
clear. The challenge in demonstrating something as a super 
precedent is ensuring that all relevant factors are in fact pre-
sent and fixed.  
 The fourth criticism is that many of the cases we call super 
precedents—Brown, for instance—appear not to have had fixed 
meanings over time. In constitutional adjudication, the Court 
often redefines, reinterprets, and modifies its prior decisions. 
Thus, many cases apparently fail to qualify as super precedents 
because the initial decision—or, at least what the Court said in 
it about the Constitution—has not endured intact.  
 The fact that a precedent’s meaning has not remained nar-
rowly fixed is, however, not necessarily an indication it has 
failed to achieve the status of a super precedent. Every judicial 
precedent has the potential to perform many functions in con-
stitutional law. What matters is whether a precedent continues 
to perform at least one of these basic functions, which include 
(but are not limited to) constraining subsequent litigation, po-
litical symbolism, framing the Court’s agenda, facilitating a 
public dialogue on constitutional meaning, educating the public 
(or others) about the Constitution, implementing constitutional 
values, and chronicling or clarifying constitutional history. A 
super precedent needs to perform only one of these functions, 
not all of them. 
 The fifth criticism is that there appears to be no doctrinal 
support for the notion of super precedent. I agree that the 
Court has not recognized the concept of super precedent and 
that the Court is unlikely ever to do so. But, it is safe to say 
that the Court talks about some prior decisions as if they had 
such status. There are cases that the Court treats as if they 
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were super precedents, and Marbury82 is just one example. 
Moreover, the point is not whether the Supreme Court ex-
pressly has used the magic words “super precedent” to describe 
some of its decisions. The point is that super precedent is the 
culmination of a series of constitutional decisions both on and 
off the Supreme Court. A single factor is not enough, at least in 
my judgment, to establish something as a super precedent. But, 
the absence of a single factor may be enough to deprive a deci-
sion of the status of being a super precedent. Becoming a super 
precedent requires the convergence of a number of factors, in-
cluding consistent support from national political leaders as 
well as the Court for a particular constitutional judgment. 
Thus, a closer look at the confirmation process for Supreme 
Court Justices as one forum for expressing such support may 
be in order. 
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUPER PRECEDENT FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
As Daniel Farber has suggested and as I have argued 
elsewhere, a fundamental tension exists between respect for 
precedent and inflexible adherence to a judicial philosophy of 
original understanding.83 Supreme Court and other judicial 
nominees got into trouble in the 1980s and 1990s because, as 
Henry Monaghan has pointed out, considerable constitutional 
doctrine is not based on and is fundamentally irreconcilable 
with original understanding.84 The most rigorous originalist 
must acknowledge this doctrine as all wrongly decided, and in-
tellectual integrity requires they vote to overturn any decision 
they deem as wrongly decided. Originalists, at least the most 
rigorous ones, have difficulty in developing a coherent, consis-
tently applied theory of adjudication that allows them to ad-
here to originalism without producing instability, chaos, and 
havoc in constitutional law. Strict adherence to originalism re-
quires some upheaval in constitutional law. 
A possible explanation for the existence of the three differ-
ent kinds of super precedent is that each reflects, in a different 
way, the intricate network effects of multiple judicial and po-
82. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
83. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 25 
(2002). 
84. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 724–27 (1988). 
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litical practices and decisions. Once other institutions invest in, 
and rely upon, particular judicial practices and decisions, these 
practices and decisions become more deeply ingrained in our 
legal system. The more ingrained a particular judicial practice 
or decision, the more difficult it becomes to undo. As layers be-
come deeply embedded and encrusted, the more immune they 
become to judicial excavation.85 Of course, why some rather 
than other judicial practices and decisions become deeply in-
grained remains a difficult question. Because these appear to 
be network effects, it is useful to examine the network within 
which the Justices operate. 
The construction of the Supreme Court is the consequence 
of a series of political choices by national political leaders. The 
Court tends to be what political leaders make it. Thus, it is in-
teresting to note that three successive Republican appointees 
as Chief Justice—Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and 
John Roberts—were each appointed to help lead the Supreme 
Court away from what it had become under an earlier Chief 
Justice, Earl Warren. Yet, much of the Warren Court’s juris-
prudence endures, in spite of the fact that in the 36 years since 
Earl Warren left the Supreme Court, Republican presidents 
have appointed 11 of 13 Justices.86 A theory worth pondering is 
whether, in spite of the rhetoric of these presidents, political 
circumstances have made it impossible for them to achieve 
their professed agendas. Political circumstances have conceiva-
bly made the appointments of Justices with radical views re-
garding stare decisis impossible. Let me put the point a differ-
ent way. When some conservative commentators cite the three 
or four decisions they most would like to see overruled, they of-
ten cite such cases as Roe v. Wade, Lemon v. Kurtzman,87 and 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.88 These 
are of course Burger, not Warren, Court decisions, while the 
85. This tracks Barry Friedman’s and Scott Smith’s notion of the sedi-
mentary Constitution. See generally Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The 
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
86. U.S. Supreme Court Justices, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/portlet/
justices/chrono (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (offering links to brief biographies of 
each Supreme Court Justice). 
87. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (establishing a three-pronged test for de-
termining whether a government-sponsored message violates the Establish-
ment Clause). 
88. 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (holding that the determination of state
immunity from federal regulation does not turn on whether a particular gov-
ernmental function is “integral” or “traditional”). 
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decisions that often provoke derision of the Supreme Court 
these days are such cases as Lawrence v. Texas89 and Roper v. 
Simmons90 (but not United States v. Virginia (VMI),91 Romer v. 
Evans,92 or the older case of Goldberg v. Kelly93). As the Warren 
Court recedes into memory, its precedents become harder to ex-
tract. They become more calcified. As they become more calci-
fied, they become more entrenched. As they become more en-
trenched, some continue down the path toward becoming super 
precedents. 
The nominations of John Roberts, Harriet Miers,94 and 
Samuel Alito are instructive. The Senate performs a critical 
function as a gatekeeper to filter out the views it wants to see 
reflected and those that it does not want to see reflected on the 
Court. Their respective confirmation proceedings reflected the 
Senate’s perennial efforts to use its confirmation authority to 
weaken Supreme Court decisions with which it disagrees and 
strengthen those with which a critical mass of senators agree.95 
The respective journeys of these nominees through the confir-
mation process were different from those followed by the em-
battled judicial nominees of the 1980s and 1990s. John Roberts 
avoided controversy by rejecting fidelity to any particular the-
ory of constitutional interpretation. Instead, he espoused a phi-
losophy of “judicial modesty;” he likened judging to umpiring; 
and he called himself someone who liked “bottom-up” judging, 
which included a healthy degree of respect for stare decisis.96 
89. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down the ban on sodomy).
90. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (finding the execution of minors unconstitu-
tional). 
91. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (considering the Virginia Military Institute’s
admissions policy). 
92. 517 U.S. 620, 623–26 (1996) (finding Colorado’s ban on protection to
victims of sexual orientation discrimination unconstitutional). 
93. 397 U.S. 254, 269–71 (1970) (holding that states must give a hearing
to public aid recipients before the aid is ended). 
94. Michael Fletcher, White House Counsel Miers Chosen for Court, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A1. 
95. The dynamic works in both directions—the Senate helps to shape the
Court and the Court influences how the Senate functions in confirmation pro-
ceedings (and other settings in which it renders constitutional judgments). On 
the important relationship between the Supreme Court’s constitutional deci-
sion making and the constitutional activities of nonjudicial actors (including 
the President and the Congress), see Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court Term: 
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Court, and Law, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003). 
96. See Jeffrey Rosen, Answer Key, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 2005, at
16, 20. 
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Part of the brilliance of Roberts’ descriptions of himself is that 
he invented new concepts with which to discuss judicial phi-
losophy that had the multiple advantages of not appearing to 
be inconsistent with substantial amounts of constitutional law, 
of appealing to those evaluating him, and of not backing him 
into a corner on the cases likely to come before him over the 
next few decades. 
Yet, Roberts, Miers, and Alito each owed their respective 
nominations to a president who had vowed not to make the 
mistakes of his Republican predecessors—namely President 
Reagan and his father—in appointing Justices who failed to 
fulfill the Republican agenda of overturning liberal decisions 
such as Roe v. Wade. President George W. Bush seemed deter-
mined to go further when he promised to nominate “strict con-
structionists” and people in the mold of Justice Antonin Scalia 
or Justice Clarence Thomas,97 both of whom had made clear 
their desires to overrule the precedents long criticized by con-
servative scholars and activists. But, at least one problem 
President Bush and particularly his Supreme Court nominees 
encountered seems to have been super precedent. Nominees 
with public records of opposing the decisions that President 
Bush or others have wanted to undo encounter an insurmount-
able problem in the form of super precedent. The President 
avoided nominees with judicial philosophies that clearly would 
have led them to favor overruling not just arguably settled 
cases like Roe and Griswold, but more deeply entrenched deci-
sions supporting the constitutionality of the New Deal, the 
Great Society, and landmark environmental legislation. The 
latter nominees had philosophies that would have appeared, in 
other words, to have led them to favor producing havoc or chaos 
in constitutional law. Someone who would seem to favor pro-
ducing havoc or chaos in constitutional law is a hard sell not 
only to the Senate, but also the American people. 
Chief Justice Roberts was a model for avoiding pitfalls in 
the confirmation process. It is possible he may have been too 
good a model. He constantly espoused respect for precedent 
throughout his hearings. He may or may not have been a fire-
brand when he worked in the Office of the Attorney General, 
the White House, or in Office of the Solicitor General, but he 
was not a firebrand when he appeared in front of the Senate 
97. See Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court: Conservatives, Liberals
Ready for Heated Debate, CNN.COM, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2005/POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush/index.html. 
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Judiciary Committee. He no doubt understands that President 
Bush would love to see him not only vote as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist did but also move the Court further to the right. Yet, 
John Roberts the nominee accepted some judicial decisions in-
consistent with that political agenda, including those recogniz-
ing a marital right of privacy,98 the framework for analyzing 
separation of powers conflicts,99 the constitutionality of the 
1965 Voting Rights Act,100 and heightened scrutiny for gender 
classifications.101 Roberts even acknowledged Roe as “settled 
law,” and recognized that overruling a precedent would be “a 
jolt to the legal system.”102 One has to assume that some over-
rulings would produce more of a “jolt” to the system than oth-
ers, and some might fatally electrocute the system. While Chief 
Justice Roberts suggested it was not unthinkable for the Su-
preme Court to overrule settled law, he made abundantly clear 
that his philosophy of judicial modesty is grounded, at least in 
part, on respect for what came before. Roberts acknowledged 
that predictability, stability, consistency, and reliance are val-
ues to be taken into account in constitutional adjudication, and 
it would seem to follow that these values ought to count in most 
cases.103 It further follows that there may be at least some in-
stances in which the values promoted by fidelity to precedent 
become compelling. A Court that overrules too many precedents 
not only sets a bad example for the Courts that follow (because 
it provides no incentive to respect the work of its predecessors), 
but also signals permission for other branches to view its deci-
sions with the same lack of respect with which it views them. A 
healthy respect for precedent means learning to live with deci-
sions with which you disagree. When Roberts went further to 
describe himself as a “bottom-up” kind of judge,104 he signaled 
that his inclination is to decide cases incrementally and to infer 
principles from the records of the cases below. A bottom-up 
judge is willing to learn from experience, which necessarily 
means that a good deal of our experience has to be left in tact. 
98. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 186 (statement of
Judge John Roberts). 
99. Id. at 382 (statement of Judge John Roberts).
100. Id. at 169 (statement of Judge John Roberts).
101. Id. at 190–91 (statement of Judge John Roberts).
102. Gwyneth K. Shaw, Roberts: Roe ‘settled as precedent’, BALT. SUN, Sept.
14, 2005, at 1A. 
103. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 20.
104. See id.
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Harriet Miers, in the short period in which she was a 
nominee to the Court, took pains to avoid appearing as if she 
favored any radical thinking, or results, in constitutional law. 
To be sure, she had no public record of radical opinions—
indeed, she seemed to have few if any fixed opinions about con-
stitutional law. This might have made her attractive as a 
nominee to President Bush—she might have been a nominee 
who was committed to ruling as he would have liked but who 
had no paper trail suggesting any such disposition. Interest-
ingly, it was the President’s supporters who questioned her 
credentials most vigorously. They wondered, not too subtly, 
whether she would become the “obsequious instrument of [the 
President’s] pleasure,” as Alexander Hamilton once described 
the kind of nominee the Senate ought to reject.105 She tried to 
answer the concerns of her critics with assurances that she be-
lieved judges needed to be “humble,” language that had been 
intended, no doubt, to echo Chief Justice Roberts. When Repub-
lican senators, among others, demanded to see some of her 
work as Chief White House Counsel in order to get a better 
idea of her ideological commitments and professional compe-
tence, the President refused on the basis of executive privilege. 
In the end, she withdrew her nomination to avoid jeopardizing 
the confidentiality of her work as Chief White House Coun-
sel.106 
In the immediate aftermath of Miers’ withdrawal, it was 
not clear whether, or why, the White House had failed to fore-
see that her nomination would have triggered opposition on 
ideological grounds from conservatives or requests for docu-
ments arguably protected by executive privilege. Whether the 
assertion of executive privilege was genuine or merely a pretext 
for her withdrawal, it is noteworthy that she based her with-
drawal on her (and the President’s) adherence to a conventional 
position—protecting the confidentiality of the work product of 
the White House Counsel’s office.107 Defending a nomination on 
the basis of a disregard for a fundamental principle of separa-
tion of powers—respect for executive privilege—would not have 
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1999). 
106. Edward Epstein, Miers Withdraws as Court Nominee, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 28, 2005, at A1. 
107. Id. (“‘I have steadfastly maintained that the independence of the ex-
ecutive branch be preserved and its confidential documents and information 
not be released to further a confirmation process,’ [Miers] wrote in her with-
drawal letter.”). 
1230 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1204 
 
helped the nomination. The nomination would have become 
mired in fallout from the President’s failure to demand respect 
for executive privilege in that setting. 
Enter Judge Samuel Alito. Judge Alito’s fifteen-year record 
on the federal court of appeals demonstrates, among other 
things, a variety of propensities, including deference to execu-
tive power and construing congressional powers narrowly.108 As 
a lower court judge, he demonstrated respect for Supreme 
Court precedent. Yet, his record also included harsh criticisms 
of some Supreme Court precedents made while he was working 
for the Reagan Justice Department.109 In his Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings, he repeatedly stressed that his personal 
views would play no role in his discharge of his duties as a Su-
preme Court Justice.110 As a witness, he said as little as possi-
ble on most subjects. To the extent he addressed the subject, he 
expressed almost as much respect for stare decisis as Chief Jus-
tice Roberts did in his confirmation hearings.111 While Justice 
Alito indicated his concerns that the Court’s attempt to main-
tain a strict wall of separation between church and state has 
not always been coherent or workable,112 he avoided that sub-
ject in his hearings. He hastened to reassure senators of his 
recognition of the right to privacy at least to the extent it was 
recognized in Griswold.113 His supporters repeatedly praised 
his temperament and characterized him as a humble person—a 
man with a “great heart”—likely to appreciate and embody the 
108. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 18–20.
109. Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle,
WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at A1. 
110. See Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 29–32 (statement of
Judge Samuel Alito, responding to questions and comments from Sen. Ted 
Kennedy); id. at 41–42 (statement of Judge Samuel Alito, responding to ques-
tions from Sen. Charles Grassley); id. at 93–101 (statement of Judge Samuel 
Alito, responding to questions from Sen. Jeff Sessions).  
111. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 3, 4, 6, 7, 28, 124, 128,
131, 133 (statements of Judge Samuel Alito). 
112. Charles Babington, Senators Praise Nominee’s Candor: Alito Shows
Willingness to Discuss Controversial Issues Facing Supreme Court, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at A7 (“Many liberal groups fear further erosion of the 
separation of church and state if the court shifts to the right . . . Sen. John 
Cornyn (R-Tex.) told reporters that Alito ‘did commiserate with me a little bit 
about the problems that the Supreme Court has had in coming up with a co-
herent body of law that is clear and can be easily applied, and can be predict-
able in a way that doesn’t discourage people from expressing their religious 
views.’”). 
113. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 2, 134 (statements of
Judge Samuel Alito). 
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importance of humility and modesty in judging.114 Throughout 
the hearings, Republican senators defending Alito discounted 
any possibility that his appointment could destabilize the 
Court, constitutional doctrine, or both.115 
CONCLUSION 
John Roberts’ confirmation as Chief Justice of the United 
States was historic for a number of reasons. Besides becoming 
the youngest Chief Justice since John Marshall was appointed 
in 1801 at the age of 45, Roberts’ confirmation hearings fea-
tured some new terminology for describing judging and consti-
tutional law. In particular, he did not dispute (at least ex-
pressly) that some prior decisions of the Court may be fairly 
described as super precedent because of their legal, social, 
and/or political importance. As a descriptive matter, it is possi-
ble to identify such precedent in constitutional law. Super 
precedents may have several distinctive features, including es-
tablishing basic frameworks or propositions of constitutional 
law; receiving repeated support and reinforcement by national 
political institutions, the Court, and societal acquiescence; and 
providing the foundation for the development of constitutional 
doctrine in one or more areas. Precedents with these features 
may come in such diverse forms as supporting foundational 
practices, foundational doctrine, and foundational decisions. In 
whatever form they come, however, they pose challenges to 
constitutional theorists, who must adjust their descriptive 
theories of the Court’s operations to account for their functional 
status as super precedents. Moreover, the possible existence of 
super precedent provides a basis for future questioning of Su-
preme Court nominees, and perhaps even other judicial nomi-
nees. Super precedent may be an integral part of the Court that 
endures over time. It may thus become an important considera-
tion in evaluating not only future Supreme Court nominees but 
also future efforts to reconfigure the institutional design or op-
erations of the United States Supreme Court. 
114. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 546 (statement of
Sen. Tom Coburn). 
115. See Babington, supra note 112.
